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Abstract  Hahn and Wallsten [7] wrote that network 
neutrality  “usually means that broadband service pro- 
viders charge consumers only once for Internet access, 
do not favor one content provider over another, and do 
not charge content  providers  for sending information 
over broadband lines to end users.”  In this  paper we 
study the implications of non-neutral behaviors under a 
simple model of linear demand-response to usage-based 
prices. We  take  into account  advertising revenues for 
the content provider and consider both cooperative and 
non-cooperative scenarios. In particular, we model the: 
impact of side-payments  between  service and content 
providers, consider an access provider that offers multi- 
ple service classes, and model leader-follower (Stackel- 
berg game) dynamics. We finally study the additional 
  
* A shorter version of this paper will be presented in September 
and will appear in Proc.  of the ETM  2010 Workshop. 
 
E. Altman & P. Bernhard 
INRIA 
2004 Route des Lucioles 
06902 Sophia-Antipolis, France 
E-mail:  {eitan.altman,pierre.bernhard}@inria.fr 
 
S. Caron & G. Kesidis 
CS&E and EE Depts 
Pennsylvania State Univ. 
University Park, PA, 16802 
E-mail:  kesidis@engr.psu.edu. 
 
J. Rojas-Mora 
Fac. of Econ. and Bus. Sci. 
Univ.  of Barcelona, 
08034 Barcelona, Spain 
E-mail:  jrojasmo7@alumnes.ub.edu 
 
S. Wong Fac. of 
Law Univ.  of 
Corun˜a 
15071 A Corun˜a, Spain 
E-mail:  swong@udc.es 
option for one provider to determine the amount of side 
payment  from the  other provider. We  show that  not 
only do the content provider and the internaut suffer, 
but also the Access Provider’s performance degrades. 
   
1 Introduction 
 
Network neutrality  is an approach to providing net- 
work access  without  unfair discrimination among ap- 
plications, content or traffic sources. Discrimination oc- 
curs when there are two applications, services or con- 
tent providers that require the same network resources, 
but one is offered better quality of service (shorter de- 
lays, higher transmission capacity, etc.) than the other. 
How to define what is “fair” discrimination is still sub- 
ject to controversy,  and the  underlying economic and 
policy issues have not been fully debated1 . A preferen- 
tial treatment of traffic is considered fair as long as the 
preference is left to the user2 . Internet Service Providers 
 
1   The recent decision on Comcast v. the FCC was expected to 
deal with  the subject of “fair” traffic  discrimination, as the FCC 
ordered Comcast to stop interfering  with  subscribers’ traffic  gen- 
erated by peer-to-peer networking applications. The Court of Ap- 
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit was asked to review this 
order by Comcast, arguing not only on the necessity of managing 
scarce network resources, but also on the non-existent jurisdiction 
of the FCC over network  management practices. The Court  de- 
cided that the FCC did not have express statutory authority over 
the subject, neither demonstrated that its action was ”reasonably 
ancillary  to the [...] effective performance of its statutorily man- 
dated responsibilities”. The  FCC  was deemed, then,  unable to 
sanction discriminatory practices on Internet’s traffic  carried out 
by American  ISPs, and the underlying  case on the “fairness” of 
their discriminatory practices was not even discussed. 
2   Nonetheless, users are just  one of many  actors in  the  net 
neutrality debate, which has been enlivened throughout the world 
by several public consultations for new legislations on the subject. 
The  first  one, proposed in  the  USA,  was looking  for  the  best 
2(ISPs) may have interest in traﬃc discrimination either
for technological or economic purposes. Traﬃc conges-
tion, especially due to high-volume peer-to-peer traf-
ﬁc, has been a central argument for ISPs against the
enforcement of net neutrality principles. However, it
seems many ISPs have blocked or throttled such traﬃc
even during periods without congestion.
ISPs recently claimed that net neutrality acts as a
disincentive for capacity expansion of their networks.
In [3], the authors studied the validity of this argument
and came to the conclusion that, under net neutrality,
ISPs invest to reach a social optimal level, while they
tend to under/over-invest when neutrality is dropped.
In their setting, ISPs stand as winners while content
providers (CPs) are left in a worse position, and users
who pay the ISPs for preferential treatment are bet-
ter oﬀ while other consumers have a signiﬁcantly worse
service.
ISPs often justify charging CPs by quantifying the
large amount of network resources “big” content provi-
ders use. On the other hand, the content and services
the CPs oﬀer contribute to the demand for Internet ac-
cess, and thus beneﬁt the ISPs. Shapley values may be
used to obtain fair and Pareto optimal revenue-sharing
between diﬀerent types of players, e.g., [10,11]. That
is, Shapley values can prescribe whether and how (i)
CPs should share third-party advertising revenue en-
abled by subscribers’ network access, or (ii) ISPs should
share subscription revenue enabled by their customers’
demand for online content and services.
In this paper, we focus on violations of the neutral-
ity principles deﬁned in [7] where broadband service
providers
– charge consumers more than “only once” through
usage-based pricing, and
– charge content providers through side-payments.
Within a simple game-theoretic model, we examine how
regulated3 side payments, in either direction, and de-
mand-dependent advertising revenues aﬀect equilibrium
usage-based prices. We also address equilibria in Stack-
elberg leader-follower dynamics.
means of preserving a free and open Internet [15]. The second
one, carried out in France, asks for diﬀerent points of view over
net neutrality [4]. A third one was presented by the EU during
summer 2010, looking for a balance on the parties concerned as
users are entitled to access the services they want, while ISPs and
CPs should have the right incentives and opportunities to keep
investing, competing and innovating [13].
3 In the European Union, dominating positions in telecommu-
nications markets (such as an ISP imposing side-payments to
CPs at a price of his choice) are controlled by the article 14,
paragraph 3 of the Directive 2009/140/EC, considering the ap-
plication of remedies to prevent the leverage of a large market
power over a secondary market closely related.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In
section 2, we describe a basic model and derive Nash
equilibria for competitive scenarios and optimal collab-
orative scenarios. We consider potentially non-neutral
side-payments in section 3 and advertising revenues in
section 4, analyzing in each case how they impact equi-
librium revenues. We consider an ISP oﬀering multi-
ple service classes in section 5. In section 6, we study
leader-follower dynamics. In Section 7 we consider the
case where one provider can control the amoount of
side payments from the other one. We show that this
results in a dramatic degradation of performance for all
actors: at equilibrium, the demand is shown to be zero.
We conclude in section 8 and discuss future work.
2 Basic model
Our model encompasses three actors:
– the internauts (users), collectively,
– a network access provider for the internauts, collec-
tively called ISP1, and
– a content provider and its ISP, collectively called
CP2.
The two providers play a game to settle on their (usage-
based) prices. The internauts are modeled through their
demand response.
Consumers are assumed willing to pay a usage-based
fee (which can be $0/byte) for service/content that re-
quires both providers.
Denote by pi ≥ 0 the usage-based price leveed by
provider i (ISP1 being i = 1 and CP2 being i = 2).
We assume that the demand-response of customers,
which corresponds to the amount (in bytes) of con-
tent/bandwidth they are ready to consume given prices
p1 and p2, follows a simple linear model (e.g., [5]):
D = D0 − d(p1 + p2). (1)
With such a proﬁle, we are dealing with a set of homo-
geneous users sharing the same response coeﬃcient d
to price variations. Infrastructure and operating costs
borne by the ISPs and CPs [12] are not considered here.
The parameter D0 corresponds to the demand under
pure ﬂat-rate pricing (p1 = 0 = p2).
Demand should be non-negative, i.e.,
p1 + p2 ≤ D0
d
=: pmax.
Provider i’s usage-based revenue is given by
Ui = Dpi. (2)
32.1 Non-Cooperation
Suppose the providers do not cooperate. An interior
Nash Equilibrium Point (NEP) (p∗1, p
∗
2) of this two-
player can be obtained from the ﬁrst order optimality
conditions
∂Ui
∂pi
(p∗1, p
∗
2) = 0, for i = 1, 2,
which lead to p∗1 = p
∗
2 = D0/(3d). The demand at equi-
librium is thus D∗ = D0/3 and the revenue of each
provider is
U∗i =
D20
9d
. (3)
2.2 Collaboration
Now suppose there is a coalition between ISP1 and
CP2. Their overall utility is then Utotal := U1+U2 = Dp,
and an optimal point (p∗1, p
∗
2) satisﬁes
∂Utotal
∂pi
(p∗1, p
∗
2) = D
∗ − d(p∗1 + p∗2) = 0 for i = 1, 2,
which yields p∗ := p∗1 + p
∗
2 = D0/(2d). The demand at
equilibrium is then D∗ = D0/2, greater than in the non-
cooperative setting. The overall utility U∗total = D
2
0/(4d)
is also greater than D20/(4.5d) for the competitive case.
Assuming both players share this revenue equally (triv-
ially, the Shapley values are {1/2, 1/2} in this case), the
utility per player becomes
U∗i =
D20
8d
, (4)
which is greater than in the competitive case. So, both
players beneﬁt from this coalition.
3 Side-Payments under Non-Cooperation
Let us suppose now that there are side payments be-
tween ISP1 and CP2 at (usage-based) price ps. The
revenues of the providers become:
U1 = D (p1 + ps) (5)
U2 = D (p2 − ps) (6)
Note that ps can be positive (ISP1 charges CP2 for
“transit” costs) or negative (CP2 charges ISP1, e.g., for
copyright remuneration4). It is expected that ps is not
a decision variable of the players, since their utilities are
monotonic in ps and the player without control would
4 In France, a new law has been proposed recently to allow
download of unauthorized copyright content, and in return be
charged proportionally to the volume of the download.
likely set (usage-priced) demand to zero to avoid nega-
tive utility. That is, ps would normally be regulated and
we will consider it as a ﬁxed parameter in the following
(with |ps| ≤ pmax).
First, if |ps| ≤ 13pmax, the equilibrium prices are
given by
p∗1 =
1
3
pmax − ps
p∗2 =
1
3
pmax + ps
but demand D∗ = D0/3 and utilities
U∗i =
D20
9d
are exactly the same as (3) in the competitive set-
ting with no side payment. Therefore, though setting
ps > 0 at ﬁrst seems to favor ISP1 over CP2, it turns
out to have no eﬀect on equilibrium revenues for both
providers.
Alternatively, if ps ≥ 13pmax, a boundary Nash equi-
librium is reached when p∗1 = 0 and p
∗
2 =
1
2 (pmax + ps),
which means ISP1 does not charge usage-based fees to
its consumers. Demand becomes D∗ = 12 (D0 − dps),
and utilities are
U∗1 =
(D0 − dps)dps
2d
U∗2 =
(D0 − dps)2
4d
Though p∗1 = 0, U
∗
1 is still strictly positive, with rev-
enues for ISP1 coming from side-payments (and possi-
bly from ﬂat-rate monthly fees as well). Furthermore,
ps ≥ 13pmax ⇔ dps ≥ 12 (D0 − dps), which means U∗1 ≥
U∗2 : in this setting, ISP1’s best move is to set his usage-
based price to zero (to increase demand), while he is
sure to achieve better revenue than CP2 through side-
payments.
Finally, if ps < − 13pmax, the situation is similar to
the previous case (with −ps instead of ps). So, here
p∗2 = 0 and p
∗
1 =
1
2 (pmax − ps), leading to U∗2 ≥ U∗1 .
To remind, herein revenues Ui are assumed usage-
based, which means there could also be ﬂat-rate charges
in play to generate revenue for either party. Studies of
ﬂat-rate compare to usage-based pricing schemes can
be found in the literature, see, e.g., [8].
4 Advertising revenues
We suppose now that CP2 has an additional source of
(usage-based) revenue from advertising that amounts
to Dpa. Here pa is not a decision variable but a ﬁxed
parameter.5
5 One may see pa as the result of an independent game between
CP2 and his advertising sources, the details of which are out of
the scope of this paper.
44.1 Non-Cooperation
The utilities for ISP1 and CP2 are now:
U1 = [D0 − d · (p1 + p2)] (p1 + ps) (7)
U2 = [D0 − d · (p1 + p2)] (p2 − ps + pa) (8)
Here, the Nash equilibrium prices are:
p∗1 =
1
3
pmax − ps + 13pa
p∗2 =
1
3
pmax + ps − 23pa
The cost to users is thus p∗ = 23pmax− 13pa while demand
is D∗ = 13 (D0 + dpa). Nash equilibrium utilities are
given by
U∗i =
(D0 + dpa)2
9d
for i = 1, 2, (9)
which generalizes equation (3) and shows how advertis-
ing revenue quadratically raises players’ utilities.
4.2 Collaboration
The overall income for cooperating providers is
Utotal = (D0 − dp)(p + pa). (10)
So, solving the associated ﬁrst-order optimality equa-
tion yields
p∗ =
pmax − pa
2
. (11)
The optimal demand is then D∗ = (D0 + dpa)/2, and
the maximal total revenue is U∗total = (D0 + dpa)
2/(4d).
Assuming this revenue is split equally between the two
providers, we get for each provider the equilibrium util-
ity
U∗i =
(D0 + dpa)2
8d
, (12)
which generalizes equation (4). As before, providers and
users are better oﬀ when they cooperate.
Thus, we see that pa > 0 leads to lower prices, in-
creased demand and more revenue for both providers
(i.e., including ISP1).
5 ISP Providing Multiple Service Classes
In this section, we suppose ISP1 is oﬀering two types of
network access service: a low-quality one l at price pl,
and a high-quality one h at price ph ≥ pl. The role of
multiple service classes in a neutral network, i.e., as
selected by the users, has previously been explored,
e.g., [9]6. Here, we split the demand D into Dl and
Dh: D = Dl + Dh (we will describe later how we im-
plement the dichotomy between Dl and Dh). For now,
assume the overall demand still has a linear response
proﬁle, i.e.,
D = D0 − d( pl + ph︸ ︷︷ ︸
formerly p1
+p2). (13)
First, we make reasonable assumptions on Dl:
1. Pricing incentives: Deﬁne Δp := ph − pl. Δp is an
incentive for consumers to chose between classes l
and h: the higher Δp is, the more likely users are to
select l. Thus, if we take x := 1/Δp and y := Dl/D,
we may see y as a function of x and model this
pricing response with the following properties:
y′(x) ≤ 0 (Dl increases with Δp) (14)
y(0) = 1 (Dl ↑ D as Δp ↑ ∞) (15)
y(∞) = 0 (Dl ↓ 0 as Δp ↓ 0) (16)
2. Congestion incentives: As Dl approaches D, we as-
sume congestion occurs in the low-quality network,
further deterring users to chose it. This motivates
the additional assumption that
|y′(x)| ↓ 0 as x ↓ 0, (17)
that is, Dl decelerates as it gets closer to D.
Deﬁne
δ :=
Δp
γpmax
, (18)
where γ > 0 is an additional users’ price-sensitivity
parameter. The following demand relation satisﬁes all
conditions (14), (15), (16) and (17):
Dl :=
(
1− e−δ)D. (19)
The providers’ utilities are then:
U1 = Dlpl + Dhph = D
(
pl + Δpe−δ
)
(20)
U2 = Dp2 (21)
5.1 Collaboration
If both players cooperate, their overall utility is
Utotal = D
(
p2 + pl + Δpe−δ
)
.
There is no NEP with strictly positive prices pi ≥ 0 for
i = 1, 2. To specify the boundary NEP (where at least
one usage-based price is zero), deﬁne
φ(x) := (1− x)e−x
and note that φ is a bijection of [0, 1].
6 Non-neutral class assignment to applications, i.e., not
application-neutral networking, is discussed in [14].
5– If p2 = 0, NEP conditions imply
δ∗ = φ−1(1/2)
p∗l =
1
3
(
1
2
− γδe−δ
)
pmax
Utility at the NEP is therefore
U∗total =
D20
9d
[
1
2
+ 2γδe−δ
]
.
[
2 +
(
2e−δ − 3) δγ]
(22)
In this setting, the value of Utotal is upper bounded
by ≈ 0.162D20d which is achieved when γ ≈ 1.53
(recall that γ is not a decision variable).
– If pl = 0, then ph = 0 and p2 = 12pmax, yielding
Utotal =
D20
4d
. (23)
Hence, irrespective of consumers’ sensitivity γ to the
price gap Δp, the best solution for the coalition is to
set-up usage-based pricing for content only, at price
p2 = pmax/2, while network access is subject to ﬂat-
rate pricing (pl = ph = 0).
5.2 Splitting Demand-Response Coeﬃcient
Now consider splitting the demand-response coeﬃcient
d into dl, dh and d2, that is:
D = D0 − dlpl − dhph − d2p2. (24)
If
d2 = dl + dh, (25)
then the interior equilibrium conditions ∇Utotal = 0
yield:
δ = φ−1(dh/d2)
pl + p2 =
D0
2d2
− δΔp0
2
(
dh
d2
+ e−δ
)
When the demand-response coeﬃcients satisfy (25), we
have an equilibrium line. Vector ﬁeld plots of Utotal sug-
gest it is attractive (see Figure 5.2). In this particular
setting, providers can thus reach U∗total with non-ﬂat
rate pricing.
However, if d2 
= dl+dh, there exists a line of attrac-
tion, but with a non-null gradient on it driving players
toward border equilibria. Hence, the conclusion of sub-
section 5.1 also holds in this more generalized setting.
Fig. 1 Attraction of the equilibrium line.
5.3 Non-Cooperation
When ISP1 and CP2 compete, again there is no interior
NEP (with all prices pi strictly positive). In fact, the
condition ∇pl,phU1 = 0 implies pl = 0 = ph and D =
0, so ISP1 has to relax condition ∂U1∂pl = 0 by setting
pl = 0 (i.e., ﬂat-rate pricing for the best-eﬀort service
l). The solution to the two remaining Nash equilibrium
conditions is then:
p2 =
1
4
[√
9γ2 + 2γ + 1− 3γ + 1
]
· pmax (26)
ph =
γ
2
√
9γ2 + 2γ + 1− 3γ + 2 · pmax (27)
By deﬁning f2(γ) := p2/pmax and fh(γ) := ph/pmax, we
then have
U∗1 (γ) = fh(γ) · (1− fh(γ)− f2(γ))D0pmax
U∗2 (γ) = f2(γ) · (1− fh(γ)− f2(γ))D0pmax
Figure 2 shows utilities at equilibrium (as fractions of
D0pmax). We see that, in any case, CP2 has the advan-
tage in this game: U∗2 is always greater to U
∗
1 , irrespec-
tive of consumers’ sensitivity γ to usage-based prices.
Here, γ → 0 means users are so sensitive to any
usage-based price that they will always choose the best-
eﬀort service (which is subject to ﬂat-rate pricing). Users’
price sensitivity decreases as γ increases, with the limit
γ → ∞ corresponding to the setting of section 2 with
limγ→∞ U∗i (γ) =
D20
9d .
6 Stackelberg equilibrium
Stackelberg equilibrium corresponds to asymmetric game
in which one player is the leader and the other a follow-
ers. That is, actions are no longer taken independently:
the leader takes action ﬁrst, and then the follower re-
acts.
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Fig. 2 Utilities as functions of users’ sensitivity to usage-based
pricing.
Though the dynamics of the games are diﬀerent
from the previous study, equations (7) and (8) still hold,
with ﬁxed pa ≥ 0 and regulated ps. In the following, we
need to assume that
ps ≤ 12pmax +
1
2
pa
pa ≤ 13pmax +
1
4
ps
so that NEPs are reachable with positive prices.
If ISP1 sets p1, then CP2’s optimal move is to set
p2 =
1
2
(−p1 + pmax + ps − pa).
This expression yields D = d2 (pmax − p1 − ps + pa) and
U1 = d2 (pmax−p1−ps+pa)(p1+ps). Anticipating CP2’s
reaction in trying to optimize U1, the best move for
ISP1 is thus to set
p∗1 =
1
2
pmax − ps + 12pa,
which yields
p∗2 =
1
4
pmax + ps − 34pa.
Therefore, when ISP1 is the leader, at the NEP demand
is D∗ = 14 (D0 + dpa) and utilities are:
U∗1 =
1
8d
(D0 + dpa)2, (28)
U∗2 =
1
16d
(D0 + dpa)2. (29)
Suppose now that CP2 is the leader and sets p2 ﬁrst.
Similarly, we ﬁnd:
p∗2 =
1
2
pmax + ps − 12pa
p∗1 =
1
4
pmax − ps + 14pa
These values yield the same cost p∗ and demand D∗
for the internauts at the NEP, while providers’ utilities
become:
U∗1 =
1
16d
(D0 + dpa)2, (30)
U∗2 =
1
8d
(D0 + dpa)2. (31)
Therefore, in either case of leader-follower dynam-
ics, the leader obtains twice the utility of the follower
at the NEP (yet, his revenue is not better than in the
collaborative case).
7 Further abandoning neutrality
Throughout we assumed that the side payments be-
tween service and content providers were regulated. If
ps is allowed to be determined unilaterally by the ser-
vice provider or by the content provider (as part of
the game described in Section 3 or 4), then the worst
possible performance is obtained at equilibrium. More
precisely, the demand at equilibrium is zero, see [1].
The basic reason is that if the demand at equilibrium
were not zero then a unilateral deviation of the provider
that controls the side payment results in a strict im-
provement of its utility. (Note that the total demand is
unchanged as it does not depend on ps.)
More generally, assume that an ISP is given the
authority to control ps and that its utility can be ex-
pressed as U = f(D)× (g(ps)+h) where f is any func-
tion of the demand (and possibly also of prices other
than ps), g is a monotone strictly increasing function
of ps, and h does not depend on ps. Then at equilib-
rium, necessarily f(D) = 0, otherwize U can be further
increased by the provider by (unilaterally) increasing
ps.
The same phenomenon holds also in case the CP is
given full control over ps.
8 Conclusions and on-going work
Using a simple model of linearly diminishing consumer
demand as a function of usage-based price, we stud-
ied a game between a monopolistic ISP and a CP un-
der a variety of scenarios including consideration of:
non-neutral two-sided transit pricing (either CP2 par-
ticipating in network costs or ISP1 paying for copy-
right remuneration), advertising revenue, cooperation
and leadership.
In a basic model without side-payments and adver-
tising revenues, both providers achieve the same utility
at equilibrium, and all actors are better oﬀ when they
cooperate (higher demand and providers’ utility).
7When regulated, usage-based side-payments ps come
into play, the outcome depends on the value of |ps|
compared to the maximum usage-based price pmax con-
sumers can tolerate:
– when |ps| ≤ 13pmax, providers shift their prices to fall
back to the demand of the competitive setting with
no side-payments;
– when |ps| ≥ 13pmax, the provider receiving side pay-
ments sets its usage-based price to zero to increase
demand, while it is sure to be better oﬀ than his
opponent.
When advertising revenues to the CP come into
play, they increase the utilities of both providers by
reducing the overall usage-based price applied to the
users. ISP1 and CP2 still share the same utility at equi-
librium, and the increase in revenue due to advertising
is quadratic.
We considered in section 5 the implications of ser-
vice diﬀerentiation from the ISP. In our model, when
ISP1 and CP2 cooperate, the best solution for them is
to set-up usage-based prices for content only and ﬂat-
rate pricing for network access. However, when providers
do not cooperate, the ISP optimally oﬀers its best-eﬀort
service for a ﬂat rate (zero usage-based cost), resulting
in more usage-based revenue for the CP.
Under leader-follower dynamics, the leader obtains
twice the utility of his follower at equilibrium; yet, he
does not achieve a better revenue than in the coopera-
tive scenario.
In subsequent work [2], we explored the eﬀects of
content-speciﬁc (i.e., not application neutral) pricing,
including multiple CPs providing diﬀerent types of con-
tent. Also, we considered competition among multiple
providers of the same type, including diﬀerent mod-
els consumer stickiness (interia or loyalty). In on-going
work, we are also considering providers’ infrastructure
and operating costs (as in, e.g., [12]), more complex
models of end-user demand and their collective social
welfare, and the eﬀects of diﬀerent options for ﬂat-rate
pricing (e.g., [16,8]).
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